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Introduction 
HOWV 
FREE 
MEN 
CAN 
PREVAIL 
On October 6th and 7th, 1961, Freedom House spon-
sored a Freedom Assembly for the purpose of explor-
ing major problem/:; of U. S. foreign policy. Following 
the presentation of the organization's annual Free-
dom Award to Mayor Willy Brandt of West Berlin, 
a number of the nation's most distinguished experts 
and opinion ieaders in the field of international affairs 
joined in discussing various aspects of foreign policy. 
Their task was to determine priorities and directions 
for strategy in the struggle between the free world 
and Communism. This is a report on what they said, 
condensed and edited from their prepared speeches 
and extemporaneous remarks. 
Among the participants were: 
The Hon. JAMES J. WADSWORTH, former U. S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations, who deliv-
ered the keynote address. 
The Hon. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., former Assistant 
Secretary of State, who led the discussion group 
on Ideology. 
Dr. HENRY A. KISSINGER, of the Harvard Uni-
versity Center for International Affairs, who led 
the discussion group on Political Goals. 
Dr. WILLIAM R. KINTNER, deputy director of the 
University of Pennsylvania Foreign Policy Re-
search Institute, who led the discussion group 
on Military Factors. 
LEO CHERNE, executive director of the Research 
Institute of America, who led the discussion 
group on Economics. 
The Hon. GEORGE V. ALLEN, former director of 
the United States Information Agency, who 
led the discussion group on Psychological 
Approaches. 
Dr. HARRY D. GIDEONSE, president of Brooklyn 
College and president of Freedom House, who 
delivered the summation address. 
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WHITNEY NORTH SEYMOUR, past president of 
the American Bar Association, who presided at 
the closing session. 
ROSCOE DRUMMOND, Washington correspondent 
and columnist, Chairman of the Board, Freedom 
House. 
The Hon. ROGER TUBBY, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Public Affairs. 
Dr. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, director of the Re-
search Institute on Communist Affairs at Colum-
bia University. 
PAUL M. DEAC, vice president of the National Con-
federation of American Ethnic Groups. 
AMROM H. KATZ, Electronics Department of the 
RAND Corporation. 
HERBERT HARRIS, director of Public Affairs, In-
stitute of Aerospace Sciences. 
Dr. PHILIP E. MOSELY, Director of Studies, Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations. 
EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER, columnist and writer on 
foreign affairs. 
STACY MAY, economist and author. 
Mrs. BONARO OVERSTREET, author and lecturer. 
JOHN RICHARDSON, JR., president of the Free 
Europe Committee. 
CHRISTOPHER EMMET, chairman, American 
Friends of the Captive Nations. 
Dr. HUGH WOLF, director, Office of Publications, 
American Institute of Physics. 
(Other members and guests of the Board of Directors 
of Freedom House.) 
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THE KEYNOTE: 
Yardsticks for the Free World 
AMBASSADOR WADSWORTH: An assembly like 
this does not make decisions for the nation; only the 
chosen leaders can do that. But perhaps the first 
article in our freedom's charter is that those leaders 
must know what the citizenry thinks. 
We are conscious of the weaknesses in our posture 
and aware that the free world has yet to find how 
to mobilize and capitalize on its real strengths. 
What are these weaknesses and vulnerabilities? 
First, we have not been adequately aware that 
rising revulsion at the thought of global atomic war 
has been turned to good account by an opponent who 
apparently does not suffer equal revulsion. Some of 
our reactions have been born of naivete, like our 
earlier assumption that the opponent is fundamental-
ly a reasonable creature. And some have come out of 
inertia, as we turned from each crisis we survived 
with little or no planning tor the next. 
In total impact, these shortcomings could be disas-
trous. When the opponent turns each act of reason-
ableness on our part into an invitation to increase 
his pressure on us, and uses each act of firmness as 
an excuse for countermeasures, it is obvious that we 
need something more than a lament over his intran-
sigence or an anxious questioning of whether he 
really means what he threatens. 
It serves no purpose to protest that many things are 
beyond our control. If we are becoming less secure, 
less effective, it is not enough simply to complain. 
We must explore revisions in what we do and how 
we do it. 
We are doing much. But much of what we do is 
simply "for its own sake," and with little considera-
tion for the relationship to other things we are doing. 
Moreover, many societies including ours are only 
partially mobiliz.e.d, and parts of them are still 
dreaming in terms that have been ·obsolete for some 
time. The primary need, therefore, is for a tying-
together and a balancing and for a more unified sense 
of direction-in a sense, orchestration. Formal organi-
zation is only part of the problem. We cannot look to 
someone in our government to come up with the 
magic device which will blend. everything into one 
"mix" painlessly and with no loose ends. Organiza-
tion will come only when we as a people have decided 
on the character of the business at hand and what 
the priorities ought to be if freedom is to prevail 
tomorrow and fifty years from now. 
To make a contribution to that decision is our pur-
pose. Part of our problem has been clarified for us by 
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the opponent himself. By throwing down the gage to 
us in Berlin f by making clear that he is challenging 
not merely the rights of Germans, as he did thirteen 
years ago, but our own rights, our own solemn word 
and sacred honor, he has made it unnecessary for us 
to "run against peace," as the saying used to go. 
Berlin, we must remind ourselves, is neither remote 
nor only fitfully in the public attention. A defeat 
there cannot be hidden behind the jargon of com-
promise; its effects will not be delayed but immediate. 
Let us remind ourselves that it is late, that justifiably 
or not the Communists ar.e running with great self-
confidence, that their assessment of us and our will 
to respond is still dangerously low. 
They are mistaken, of course. Weare not going to 
crumble before them in Berlin or anywhere else, and 
we are going to come through this crisis with honor. 
But in addition to Berlin, it is what lies beyond that 
concerns us. This must be the last crisis we enter 
unprepared. 
Our theme is "How Free Men Can Prevail." It is not 
how they can muddle through this year or how they 
can escape with their skins or how Boon they can 
settle back into the more comfortable ways of living. 
"To prevail" means "to win," and that means to have 
a plan, a flexible strategy and a structure of priorities 
upon which the strategy is applied. 
We here probably will not write a strategy, and 
certainly not a full policy, but we may suggest 
emphasis and priorities. We may thus emerge from 
our discussions with some yardsticks against which 
we can measure the success of our policies in the days 
to come. If we succeed, we may help make it a little 
easier to translate lofty purposes into effective action. 
The Problems We Face 
Mr. TUBBY: In considering topics that fall within 
the discussion areas of our five working groups we 
find no lack of foreign relations problems. Here are 
some of them: 
How to avoid either war or surrender. 
How to achieve disarmament or a ban on nuclear 
testing with effective controls. 
How to strengthen the United Nations. 
How to check Communist aggression or subversion 
in Southeast Asia or anywhere else. 
How to broaden the economic or social base in many 
countries still in an early stage of economic 
development. 
How to reach their intellectuals and win their respect 
and understanding. 
How to deal with satellite countries. 
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What to do about U. S. economic aid to so-called 
neutrals which appear to support Moscow. 
How to reserve outer space for peaceful use. 
How to end colonialism-under the Russians or Red 
Chinese or anyone else. 
How to make the new Alliance for Progress for Latin 
America a success. 
IDEOLOGY: 
The Myth of World Opinion 
Mr. BERLE: In dealing with the Cold War, we must 
begin by discarding a lot of sanctified myths. 
First, there is the myth of world opinion. What is 
called "world opinion" often turns out to be mostly 
propaganda bought and paid for. Americans for some 
reason are supposed to take speeches of foreign 
politicians and pr.ess accounts of "popular" demon-
strations as showing world opinion on issues in the 
Cold War. When you go to the countries involved you 
discover that the much-touted politician represents 
no opinion but his own, or that of a small noisy 
group around him. 
"Demonstrations" usually are equally fictitious. In 
most countries they can be cooked up by a couple of 
organiz.ers with a little money and a few trained 
assistants. The Communist powers have even got out 
"how to do it" handbooks of instructions. In the 
demonstrations at the time of Lumumba's death, 
inquiry developed that some demonstrators did not 
know who Lumumba was or anything else about him. 
They were merely being paid a trifle to yell and break 
windows and were earning their money. The "crowds" 
were the sidewalk superintendents who gather any-
where. It was all in the instruction book. 
Leaders Versus the People 
There is, of course, a true body of opinion in literate 
countries-and even to a lesser degree in non-literate 
countries. It generally has little to do with what comes 
out of the noise-machine. The Belgrade conf.erence of 
so-called neutral nations was a star illustration of 
the difference between the two. The elements in these 
countries-indeed, in all countries-which know any-
thing about testing of nuclear bombs knew it brought 
the world closer to atomic destruction, and practically 
all knew that the Soviet Union had announced such 
tests and had begun exploding the bombs. They 
violently disapproved. Yet their representatives at 
Belgrade soft-pedalled or ran away from the problem. 
In blunt fact, these politicians did not dare to repre-
sent the opinion of their people. 
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A related myth is the assumption that personalities 
able to make headlmes are powerful voices of the 
opinion of their countries. When you visit their 
countries, you often discover they are not even 
regarded as very important. Lumumba, for example, 
was never the voice of the Congo. His death there 
produced about the same result as did the death of 
Al Capone in Chicago. In the same way, I doubt 
whether anyone now speaks for the people in Laos, 
or Haiti. 
So our problem is to distinguish real from fake 
ide.ology. There are, I am sure, certain currents of 
motion and thought widely followed throughout the 
world. Essentially they deal with objectives and 
hopes, and they have little to do with the temporary 
emotional outbreaks of occasional mob operations. 
It is true, I believe, that most peoples want to better 
their lot. This simple fact is often blown up into an 
assumed social revolution sweeping the world. The 
fact is that although most popUlations want their lot 
improved, few want the waste and cruelty that go 
with bloody revolution. Where revolutions of that 
kind occur, you find later most of the participants 
have been forced into it by the most ferocious intimi-
dation. The humble people usually have quite rational 
solutions for their problems, and these rarely involve 
killing. 
Are Nations Friendly 7 
So, I suggest, Americans should be careful in accept-
ing claimed ideological commitment as serious polit-
ical fact. In dealing with foreign nations, whatever 
their ideology, our first question must be whether the 
nation is fundamentally friendly to the United States, 
and whether its regime is viable enough to make 
friendship desirable. 
We can work-and have worked-quite comfortably 
with socialist countries. Possibly we could work quite 
comfortably with a Communist country-if it was 
friendly to us, was not a pumping station for hatred 
and disorder toward its neighbors or a colony of some 
power hostile to the United States, and had a decent 
respect for human rights. We have not yet had that 
opportunity. 
My proposal accordingly is this: In studying ideo-
logical conflict, let us first draw a sharp distinction 
between the ends which the ideology purports to 
serve and the means proposed or used to achieve 
these ends. The great principle behind President 
Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" in Latin America 
was to concentrate on the ends sought. These ends, 
agreed on by all independent Latin American 
countries, include lifting the standard of living of the 
entire region. Because methods of social organization 
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differ, each country was asked to work out its method 
of achieving those ends. Recently President Kennedy 
indicated that in foreign aid programs we also had a 
right to consider whether the country proposed to be 
a friend or an enemy of the United States. Obviously 
the United States can be of little help to a country 
whose methods involve reckless violation of human 
rights, or whose government asserts that it proposes 
to be hostile to us whenever expedient. 
Some Ideological Criteria 
The United States has the right if not the duty to 
propose its own ideological approach. But where its 
methods are not adopted, it has three criteria to apply 
to ideologies put forward by other countries: 
First: Do the endJ sought by the nation conform to 
standards we can accept? For example, we could not 
accept the ends proposed by the Nazi-Fascist regimes 
twenty years ago, nor could we work with that 
ideology now. 
Second: Do the means proposed offer a reasonable 
basis for assuming that the acceptable ends will be 
reached? We cannot, for example, accept ideology 
motivated primarily by currents of hatred which 
Communist dogma presently assumes as necessary to 
keep Communism alive. 
Third: Are the ends and means consistent with the 
reasonable national interests of a United States which 
does not wish to conquer the world, which does not 
have colonies, which does desire a rising measure of 
human welfare abroad as well as at home, and does 
desire to remain at peace if the aggressor powers will 
abandon Hitlerian ideas of world conquest? 
These, I suggest, are the questions to be answered as 
increasingly we move into a world of nations seeking 
solutions for their social and political problems. 
Mrs. OVERSTREET: I wonder whether we don't 
have in our American tradition a proper way of 
addressing ourselv:es to world opinion-even if it 
doesn't exist, so to speak, and even if it hasn't been 
formulated everywhere. It has been said here that a 
decent respect for the opinions ·of mankind requires 
that we declare the causes that impel us. Is it not our 
obligation then to make the clearest, most precise 
statement of why we do what we do, rather than to 
look to some hypothetical opinion as a determinant 
of what w.e should do? It does not seem reasonable, as 
Mr. Berle has pointed out, that every time someone 
somewhere, says "This is world opinion," we stop in 
our tracks and wonder whether we shouldn't re-
formulate our policy in accordance with it. Our obliga-
tion is rather to respect the minds of men enough to 
help them get the facts, as best we can, and to speak 
up with our reasons for doing what we intend to do. 
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Mr. DRUMMOND: How does one determine what 
American opinion is? Inevitably, there is a divergence 
in our appraisals of how we should deal with Soviet 
objectives, on the part of the political and intellectual 
leadership of this country-a difference of opinion 
between, say, Walter Lippmann on the one hand and 
David Lawrence on the other. 
In my opinion, today, as in many crises of the nation 
in the past, American public opinion has been ahead 
of American political leadership. That was true in 
1939, prior to World War II; I think it was often ~e 
during the Eisenhower Administration; and I think 
it is true today. The President of the United States 
is rightly feeling the pressure of a national consensus 
to stand firmer than he has been with respect to 
Soviet threats in different parts of the world. The 
problem, ther.efore, is not primarily to create a 
consensus of public opinion, but to bring the influence 
of public opinion to bear upon our national leadership. 
Mr. CHERNE: I agree that the great bulk of ~e 
people is far ahead of the government. It is precisely 
for this reason that I am concerned with another 
group-an articulate, effective segment of the com-
munity that does not fit under the umbrella Mr. 
Drummond has provided. To me, one of the most 
disturbing illustrations of our dilemma in this respect 
can be found in a photograph that recently appeared 
in the newspapers. It showed the faces of happy, 
smiling, adoring young American girls who had 
enjoyed the marvelous opportunity to meet with Mrs. 
Khrushchev-and to be assured by her that in fact 
the Soviet Union does not contemplate war, as is 
evidenced by the fact that they are not building bomb 
shelters. The faces of those girls crystallizes an 
important aspect of our dilemma. We have been 
vulnerable to Soviet propaganda and many of our 
people get bamboozled by the Russians without being 
aware of it. 
Dr. MOSELY: I too have a differ.ent impression from 
Mr. Drummond's. 
In some respects our public opinion is extremely con-
fused. In many parts of the country where I speak I 
find that a great many people still assume we have a 
unilateral deterrent which we can use in any way we 
want--that, somehow, this is the decisive factor. They 
seem ignorant of our movement into a period of 
bilateral deterrents, or mutual deterrents, and seem 
to assume we have an exclusive power that we some-
how should use at any time, for any question, just to 
have it co~e out the way we want. This represents a 
very large body of opinion. 
Then there is another body of opinion which is more 
concerned with finding enemies at home than it is 
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with facing up to our dangers abroad, because this 
looks a lot easier to handle and it is closer at hand. 
There is a real movement in . many parts of the 
country toward a kind of new isolationism, based on 
the belief that we can't do anything abroad until we 
settle our problems at home. 
There is in addition a very small-but in time of 
crisis possibly influential-body of thought pressing 
for unilateral disarmament, apparently on the ground 
that no one could want to destroy us because we are 
good people, and we wouldn't want to destroy anyone 
else. 
The Meaning of Words 
Mr. MOWRER: I would like to suggest that we are 
losing another part of the ideological battle, involving 
the uses and meanings of words. Some of the con-
fusion has been cleared up in the last year or so by 
the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, but 
to a great extent it still prevails. It seems to me that 
we have been remiss in accepting the use of certain 
words as they were given out either by Communists, 
or by Mrican anti-colonialists or other groups. For 
instance, we are told that all the peoples on earth 
want to be "free." But that obviously isn't so if by 
freedom you mean personal freedom, for in many of 
the new countries they have far less personal freedom 
than they had as colonies. 
It seems to me that .our authorities should explain-
both abroad and to Americans-that national inde-
pendence and personal freedom are two quite different 
things. We Americans happen to confuse them be-
cause in 1776 you could equate independence from the 
British with personal freedom. But in many of the 
newly independent countries, notably Guinea and 
Mali, the drop in personal freedom from what they 
had under the French is fantastic. They may prefer 
national independence under native tyrants to more 
freedom under foreigners. That is perhaps under-
standable--but we Americans must recognize that 
there is a great difference. 
A second phrase which is being thrown at us by 
Marxists and their disciples all over the world (even 
when they claim not to be Marxists) is "economic 
exploitation." As they use it, the phrase is largely 
buncombe. There is no question, for example, that the 
people of Katanga had the highest living standard of 
any black people in Mrica. That may be "exploita-
tion" by the Belgians or the copp.er companies, but if 
so you have got to redefine "exploitation." If they 
mean that the Katangese were not as rich as they 
would have been if the Belgians had not taken any 
money and instead had divided it all, that is true; 
but I doubt if you would have gotten the Belgians and 
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other people to dev.elop the region on that basis. 
In the same way, we were told Cuba was cruelly 
exploited by Batista. Batista was an unpleasant 
tyrant. The fact remains that Cuba had the second 
highest living standard in all of Latin America. 
A Long Range Obiective 
Dr. BRZEZINSKI: One of our difficulties is a tend-
ency to think in non-ideological terms. Against the 
kind of opponent we face, such thinking can have 
disastrous political consequences. F'or example, it 
seems to me we are in considerable danger right now 
of being faced, in the foreseeable future, with a situa-
tion whereby we remain in West Berlin but lose West 
Germany. The reason for this is we do tend to think 
in non-ideological terms, unaware of the ultimate 
significance of our actions. This forces us into a 
position of being essentially a reactive power, unlike 
the U.S.S.R. which has some notion of the pattern of 
change in world politics and has some sense of 
priorities in relationships to that pattern. 
For instance, by insisting primarily on the defense of 
our rights in Berlin, we misconstrue the very long-
range notion that the Soviets have. By forcing us 
gradually, step by step, to accept the status quo in 
Central Europe-particularly by forcing us to deal 
with East Germany only on a de facto basis-they 
hope to set in motion a chain of events in West Ger-
many which could begin to undermine the Western 
Alliance, NATO, the Common Market, and all of the 
Western unity that has been fashioned with so much 
effort and dedication in the last fifteen years. 
We have come to recognize the Soviet Union as our 
opponent. On this, there is national agreement and a 
sense of national will. But there is no sense of 
national understanding of our own position vis-a-vis 
the Soviet Union and the Sino-Soviet bloc. There has 
not been a sense of national identification in terms of 
what we ought to be accomplishing. 
Much of our action, both in the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration and the Kennedy Administration, is rooted in 
the ambivalence between our feeling on the one hand 
that we ought to be opponents of the Soviet Union 
and on the other that we ought to be civilizing the 
Soviet Union and adjusting the Russians to our 
pattern of behavior in the international community. 
This ambivalence paralyzes us and prevents us from 
taking the initiative. If we had a long-range image 
of the world and a sense of priorities, if we were 
thinking ideologically, we might take the initiative. 
The Berlin crisis has opened up a variety of oppor-
tunities for us to act forthrightly in an area of the 
world in which the Soviet Union a priori has been 
objectively handicapped. We could have done this by 
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initiating proposals between East Germany and 
European Germany on political and economic relations 
in those areas. Instead, we maintain a position of 
rigidity-thereby rigidifying the Soviet position and 
creating ambiguity in our own camp. 
This is primarily a result of the fact that we do not 
have any long-range programmatic sense of dedica-
tion in international politics. We are dealing with an 
opponent who has some sort of ideology. Perhaps it 
is a myth, as Mr. Berle said, but in many respects it 
is extremely relevant to the international politics of 
the age, to the economic development of nations. And 
the orientation of the so-called Western democracies 
is built on a bourgeois, non-ideological middle-class, 
used to the principles of compromise and adjustment. 
In that sense we are yielding to the other side, start-
ing with a handicap which we will not overcome if 
we insist on labeling all ideology a myth and insist 
instead on a dogmatically undogmatic stand. 
POLITICAL GOALS: 
Reality in the New Nations 
Dr. KISSINGER: We hear today, regarding the 
Berlin issue and a number of others, a great deal 
about the need for realism and the need to adjust to 
facts which we are powerless to change. Nothing in 
the world would ever have been changed if this 
notion were to prevail. It reflects the views of a 
society which is satisfied with the status quo and to 
which any basic change is reasonably uncomfortable; 
and it .explains in its deepest sense why our attitude 
can appear both peaceful and irrelevant to the new 
nations. 
To us, in a middle-class society in the United States, 
the reality that is most significant is the reality we 
see around us. To us, realism consists in adjustment. 
Our eminent people are people who have known how 
to operate in an existing system. The worst penalty 
they learn in their liv.es is transfer to another depart-
ment if they don't do well in the one they are in. 
To the Communists and to many people in new 
nations, the most significant reality is the future. 
What they see around them is ephemeral. If you had 
asked, in 1913, who are these ridiculous people in 
Geneva, translating German texts, going to con-
gresses, splitting hairs about abstruse points of 
Leninist doctrine, any Western businessman would 
have said, "These are ridiculous fanatics." Yet, three 
years later they changed history because they had a 
conviction; they had a sense of the future. Their 
reality was not where they were, but where they 
were going. 
11 
In Defense of the Neutrals 
I would like to say a word about the stand taken by 
the neutral nations at the Belgrade meeting in Sep-
tember 1961. There have been a few comments here 
that the behavior of these nations at Belgrade was 
morally wrong. I would like to come somewhat to 
their defense. We had no right to expect them to 
behave very much differently from the way they did. 
We had no right to act as if international relations 
were a debate in the Oxford Union, with the un-
committed sitting in the referee's chair and awarding 
a prize after they had heard all the arguments. It 
was against all reason to expect that nations barely 
come into independence could suddenly play a global 
role and make wise judgments on the whole range of 
international problems. Our sentimentality and our 
illusion has projected them into a role that they 
cannot fulfill, and that must wreck their domestic 
stability if they try to fulfill it. 
If anyone asks himself why the new nations behaved 
this way, he should look back a short twenty-two 
years ago. Was it conceivable that the United States 
would have supported Great Britain in 1939? Did 
there exist any British policy that would have in-
duced us to enter the war on the British side on the 
issue of Danzig? Where would the world have 
been in 1939 if Great Britain had said that it would 
fight against Nazism only if the United States. sup-
ported the fight? No abstract arguments could pos-
sibly have achieved American support for Great 
Britain in 1939 on the issues which w.ere of most 
consequence to the world in that day. And no Ameri-
can policy can get the kind of support many people 
were expecting out of the Belgrade powers. By the 
nature of their society, by the nature of their pre-
occupation, they cannot play a global role. They 
cannot provide a substitute for our for.eign policy. 
Consider their dilemma regarding disarmament. We 
have been criticized for not studying this problem 
carefully. Well, we have a statutory ag.ency and over 
100 full-time professionals at work on the problem. 
I don't believe a single one of the emergent nations 
has one ftill-time person studying disarmament on a 
regular basis. Under the circumstances we cannot 
expect them to come up with a formula, and we 
cannot expect them to be the arbiters of all disputes. 
The Man Who Leads a Revolution 
I think the new nations are not psychologically in 
tune with our concern with stability. For this reason, 
we have enormous difficulty conveying what we stand 
for to these people. If Castro had wanted stability, 
if Castro had wanted security, he could have been a 
bank president in Havana today. In the social circles 
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he comes from this choice was open to him. The kind 
of man that goes into the mountains, the kind of 
man who leads a revolution is not a pleasant, middle-
class intellectual disputing abstruse or abstract 
points of political doctrine. Very few revolutionaries 
make a r.evolution in order to bring into power a 
form of government which will make them dis-
pensable. Most of them undergo the suffering which 
is inseparable from revolution in order to be able to 
exercise power. 
I don't agree with those who say that the exclusive 
motivation of the new -countries is to raise their 
standard of living. I think this is only one of their 
preoccupations. They are involved with the problem 
of political legitimacy, with their notions of social 
justice and their conception of the future they will 
have. It is these preoccupations that have made it so 
very hard for us to understand either the revolution 
in the new countries or the nature of the Communist 
challenge. 
Mr. MOWRER: We must remember that our pOiition 
as a major power brings with it certain unavoidable 
risks. I submit that at the moment we are in an 
impossible situation. We are struggling between two 
admirable, but perhaps incompatible, ideals. In the 
first place, we are passionately pursuing the cause of 
peace. In this pursuit we are prepared to envisage 
partial retreats, partial surrenders. We have been 
making invisible-and not so invisible-retreats ever 
since 1944. It has gotten us nowhere but backwards. 
On the other hand, we stand committed to the defense 
and the extension of world freedom. If we are going 
to seek the extension of freedom against an adver-
sary whose chief weapon is brinkman!hip based on 
bigger and bigger nuclear devices, we will have to 
call his bluff and go to the edge of war, not once, but 
many times. 
If we are to extend freedom, we will have to begin 
applying to the adversary the kind of treatment that 
he applies to us. I do not mean, of course, that we 
should have burned Germans in this country in World 
War II simply because we were at war with Hitler. 
However, we took war measures which shocked many 
people because our military authorities were con-
vinced we had to do so to survive. My point is that 
today we will not be able to prevail and extend 
freedom if we merely try to dig in. 
"Call the Game Off" 
Every time the adversary lines up to try to break 
through somewhere or to make a pass over us, we 
say "Let's call the game off," and go home to Thanks-
giving dinner. 
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I think we are coming to the place where we. as a 
people, have to decide on the character of the business 
at hand and what the priorities ought to be. Winning 
the cold war does not exclude preventing nuclear war; 
but it means taking the risk of it. On the other hand, 
too passionate a pursuit of peace leads inevitably to 
piecemeal surrenders, if the past is any guide. 
Mr. CHERNE: When we talk of political goals as they 
affect the two Germanies let us understand what we 
are talking about. Weare talking of a Communist 
Germany and one that is not Communist. To accept 
these as "realities" means that we are accepting (and 
I am perfectly ready to debate whether perhaps we 
should) a Communist Germany. More important, we 
are accepting permanent Soviet sovereignty over the 
entire bloc of Central European nations. That is what 
is at issue. 
But what is it that Russia wants? It has been sug-
gested that the Soviet Union wishes a reduction of 
tension in that area of the world, and I agree. If you 
are sitting as a jailer of 100 million people, you are 
in daily dread there may be prison riots. Of course, 
they want a reduction of tension. 
What the Soviet Union is after, then, is a division of 
Germany-half Communist, half not--and permanent 
Western acceptance of Soviet sovereignty over the 
Central European states. In the present situation it 
would be prudent for us to pay heed to a statement 
made recently by a Soviet diplomat at the United 
Nations in a private conversation. He said, "Ameri-
cans are very odd people. They desperately try to find 
out what it is we want and then they hand it to us as 
an ultimatum." 
MILITARY FACTORS: 
The High Price of Protection 
Dr. KINTNER: The mobilization potential of this 
nation-not only military~- but political, moral and 
psychological-is not being fully utilized. Unless it 
is, we may face ultimate disaster. 
Somehow the possibility of American us"e of nuclear 
weapons has, in some circles, been made to appear 
like a morally reprehensible act. This is the equivalent 
of deciding that there is no issue worth fighting for, 
under any circumstances. In that case, the values of 
our society are meaningless. First you decide that this 
issue is not that important, then that some other issue 
is not that important--and eventually that nothing is 
that important. Under such circumstances the whole 
moral and spiritual structure of our society adds up 
to zero. 
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There are several respects in which U. S. policy has 
been remiss: 
1. Although we have said we are shifting our main 
reliance from nuclear weapons back to conventional 
arms, neither our allies nor our opponents are pre-
pared to believe it. They realize that despite the 
verbal change in policy it would take three or four 
years to make this fundamental adjustment in U. S. 
military posture. 
2. In the effort to rule out the accidental triggering 
of nuclear war we have placed so many restrictions 
on the nuclear arsenal that we may wind up by con-
vincing the enemy that we do not intend to use this 
power at all, under any circumstances. 
3. Ther.e has been some increase in our capability for 
waging guerrilla warfare, at the bottom of the con-
flict spectrum. But the great middle ground-bulk, 
visible, conventional power which you are willing to 
use-is still the fundamental military weakness of 
the Western world. The Soviets and the Chinese 
Communists are exploiting thei~ advantage in this 
sector politically, in Berlin and in Southeast Asia. 
4. Although some good work is being done on defense 
against fallout, particularly in utilizing existing 
structures for community shelters, the confusion 
r.e.garding backyard shelters could have been avoided. 
5. In the anti-missile field our pace has been far too 
slow and too cautious. We insist that each step in the 
development of our principal defensive missile, the 
Nike-Zeus, be checked out before going on to the 
next--a process we have abandoned with offensive 
missiles. 
Advantages on Both Sides 
Those are specifics. In assessing U. S. military policy 
generally, it is necessary to consider the fundamental 
differences between the Soviet system and ours and to 
weigh the advantages of each. 
In favor of the U.S.S.R. there is first the fact that 
the Soviets make central allocation of their resources 
primarily to improve and pursue their power advan-
tage. As of now, this country and the Soviet Union 
are spending approximately the same amount of 
money in the military field. But the Soviet leaders 
can allocate this money as they see fit. In the United 
States roughly 20 per cent of the gross national 
product belongs to the federal government for its 
use; half of federal income is used for other purposes. 
So the relative amount ·of resources allocated for 
power actually is lower on our side. 
Also favoring the Soviets is the centralization of 
strategy decisions. U. S. strategy is worked up 
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separately by various departments with general co-
ordination at the White House. But since everyone 
tries to get in on the act, we tend toward compromises 
which mean all things to all people. In conflict, 
strategy by committee generally is not effective. The 
conflict managers of the Soviet Union, on the other 
hand, sit in the Presidium with Mr. Khrushchev and 
his immediate cabal. They work out their plans, and 
then they use the entire resources of the Soviet State 
to implement their strategy. This has given them a 
major advantage. 
The U. S., for its part, has three main advantages of 
its own. First, as long as we occupy or have access to 
areas in the Eurasian land mass, geography is 
decidedly with us. Even in the space and missile age, 
geography is meaningful from the point of view of 
communications, tracking, warning, and other factors. 
Our geographical access also permits us to retain an 
effective alliance with the Japanese in the Far East 
and the NATO nations in Western Europe. If this 
advantage were to be turned against Ui, if we were 
ever euchred out of the Eurasian land mass, then the 
balance would go decisively the other way. This is 
why the Soviets are trying to eliminate our access to 
Eurasia by their variety of plays in the cold war-
the elimination of the base system, and so forth-
and why, also, these engagements in strange and 
faraway places, such as Laos or the Congo, have an 
important security meaning to us regardless of any 
of the political considerations involved. 
The second advantage we have is our tremendous 
economic resource. Our economy is operating at 
around 80 or 85 per cent of capacity. We have 
untapped reserves, human and material, which, if 
we wanted to use them, could give us the means to 
work our way out of the insecure position we find 
ourselves in at present. 
A third factor working for us is our system of values. 
Our society, with its traditions and its spiritual and 
political concepts, comes far closer to striking a 
responsive chord among people .everywhere than any-
thing the dialectic materialists have to offer on the 
other side of the fence. Yet we have been extremely 
reluctant to advance our values or even engage in 
ideological discussions. Because of the threat of 
thermonuclear war, we have even come to believe 
that perhaps values are not important; that maybe 
our skin is more important than what we believe in. 
Strategic Imagination 
If used fully, our advantages give us, I believe, a 
commanding position in the Gold War. But beyond 
these advantages is another element which might be 
decisive. That is the factor of "strategic imagination" 
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-the ability of one side to make better technological 
choices than the other. This means the ability to 
select from the bewildering array of weapons and 
weapons designs those that would prevail. 
Two additional factors are also crucial: 
The first is our no-first-blow policy. One problem 
with this policy is that it tends to mislead us into 
attributing to the enemy a similar reluctance to 
initiate a first strike. The no-first-blow policy also 
exacts a high pric~. You may require a defensive 
establishment one and one-half times as great as 
now in order to prevail after absorbing a devastating 
thermonuclear attack. We have been unwilling to 
accept that logic. I have nothing against the no-first-
blow policy-provided we are willing to pay the price. 
A final factor of great importance is timing. New 
threats must be foreseen, and prudent steps taken in 
advance to meet them. In the case of the Soviet 
missile threat, U. S. defensive reactions were too 
slow. 
The price of proper military preparation comes high, 
and I doubt that the present administration is any 
more ready than the last to pay it. The announcement 
that there will be military cutbacks after the current 
Berlin crisis has passed, for example, hardly squared 
with earlier announcements that we can expect con-
tinual crises and will be prepared for them. 
Mr. KATZ: I agree with almost everything said by 
Dr. Kintner, but I derive small comfort from mere 
deterrence. The more deterrence we build, the more 
danger we seem to be in. The difficulty with deter-
rence is our overwhelming preoccupation with it, to 
the exclusion of alternative policies which we should 
and could have been implementing with the time we 
were buying. 
The military advantage which we once held over the 
Soviets has disappeared. While we held it we merely 
waited for them to catch up and did little beyond 
that. There have been desultory efforts at reconcilia-
tion, at disarmament, at stabilization, but they have 
come to nought, either because they were poor ideas 
or because they were poorly implemented or because 
the Soviets would have none of it. But to discuss our 
security from a military standpoint alone is sheer 
folly. We must somehow use the time bought by the 
current military stand-off in order to work out some-
thing else, either unilaterally or multilaterally. 
Secrecy-A Danger to Russia 
In dealing with the Soviets on matters of arms con-
trol and stability, we are confronted with a certain 
inordinate and so far intractable problem: their 
passion for secrecy. They don't understand-and we 
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haven't chosen to explain it to them, p'artly because 
we hardly understand it ourselves--the disadvantages 
of secrecy. They are forcing us to spend more and 
more money to buy protection against weapons that 
are never revealed to us. Perhaps we are spending 
too much, but we can't be sure. We are like men who 
are on one side of a large wall behind which are 
hiding three tigers. We must protect ourselves from 
the tigers. Three guns would be ample-but, not 
knowing how many tig.ers there are, we may order 
17 guns. From the standpoint of the tigers and the 
men alike, this is a poor policy. We would both be 
better off if we put in a transparent glass. 
It is up to us to demonstrate forcibly to them that 
secrecy is not as valuable to them as they think it is. 
They are relying upon this secrecy for protection, but 
it does not really protect them. The commanding 
officer of a missile station outside Moscow believes 
his missile is protected, but he can never be sure. 
Secrecy can evaporate ov,ernight and he may not 
know it. He would be much better off if his missile 
were protected by 27* feet of concrete. And so 
might we. 
Missile Bookkeeping 
Suppose we did know the location of their missiles 
and their number. It is usually assumed that such 
information would furnish target data for counter-
force, but this is questionable. Even if we know 
where their missiles are, it is far from certain that 
they would be our primary targ.ets. For one thing, 
we may be "going second"-responding to an attack 
-and the Soviet missiles may already have been 
fired. And even if the missile is still there, it may 
not be a good target. If it costs us three missiles to 
get one missile, this is poor bookkeeping. 
We must persuade them that secrecy forces the arms 
r ace into higher and ever-increasing spirals; and that 
there is absolutely no chance for any form of arms-
control agreement as long as secrecy goes on to its 
present extent. 
Secrecy works against the Russians in one other way. 
In this country there is a continuous open debate in 
the halls of Congress and elsewhere. So much infor-
mation is made public that it is hard for anyone man 
to read all the reports that come out. This continuous 
debate has served to jack up our own thinking. Those 
of us who work in classified material know very well 
that, by and large, continuous unclassified, open 
debate has served to advance the classified discussion 
proceeding behind closed doors. 
The Russians haven't got anything that resembles 
this. I would argue-admittedly without much proof 
-that their thinking must lag behind ours as a result. 
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I have deliberately exaggerated this position, trying 
to simplify it. But if I am correct, we should think 
seriously about educating the Russians to the un-
desirability of secrecy. 
Perhaps we might draw up a list of things we are 
persuaded they ought to be more worried about than 
they are. These would be things of mutual worry so 
perhaps something could be done about the situation. 
The danger of accidental war might be a prime 
candidate for this list. 
Dr. BRZEZINSKI: The Soviets have had great suc-
cess at convincing us that there is an imbalance in 
favor of the camp of socialism. This aneg.ed im-
balance permits the Soviet Union to adopt aggressive 
policies which the West accepts because it feels that 
the balance is against it. But what will happen when 
the Soviets feel that the objective balance actually 
has turned in their favor? There are strong indica-
tions that this will occur within the next five years. 
When it happens, the Soviets can be expected to 
adopt policies even more extreme than those followed 
in the past. 
What we need to do is cut down on the Soviet 
unilateral risk-taking capacity that results from our 
conceding to them an increment of strength which 
does not exist. We know the Soviet population is 
immensely fearful of a war-more fearful perhaps 
than even the American population. This is partly 
because of the ignorance of the American population 
as to what a war might mean, and partly because 
the American population now feels the time has 
come for the United States to get tough-to adopt 
a policy more commensurate with its own proclaimed 
objectives. 
Persuading the Russians of War's Danger 
But we have not responded to Soviet military threats 
by conveying to the Soviet population the dangers of 
war. A great deal more could be done by our media 
of mass communications aimed at people behind the 
Iron Curtain-notably the Voice of America-to con-
vince the Soviet population there is indeed a very 
serious danger of total destruction. For although the 
Soviet people fear war, they have no sense of the 
dimension of the disaster which a nuclear war would 
bring to them. This ignorance is a major advantage 
for the Soviet government. 
There is a related point I would 'like to make. The 
Russians are able to operate with a sense of security 
because of what I consider to be our excessive 
predictability. In this country there is a political elite 
which is pacifist and aims at adjustment, compromise, 
stability, the status quo. This gives the Soviets a 
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sense of understanding our rationality, and allows 
them to plan ev.ery move with full knowledge of how 
we are likely to react. 
To counter this, we must create a certain enigma of 
the West, just as there is an enigma of the Soviet 
Union. Perhaps someone around the President could 
give the impression that this country, if pushed too 
far, might respond-as the Soviet Union does-
irrationally, unpredictably. This too would diminish 
the Russians' capacity for risk-taking. 
Finally we have to be conscious of political factors 
already to the enemy's advantage, and take care that 
we do not turn them further to that advantage. 
Could Czechs and Poles Be Neutralized? 
Here, particularly, the problem of Czechoslovakia and 
Poland is relevant. The armed forces of both these 
nations would be engaged in any war, if only to pro-
vide security behind the front-line zone in Germany. 
It would be of the utmost importance if we could 
prev.ent this stability from being achieved. Here, 
again, the political factor enters into the situation. It 
has been said that if we try to recognize the Oder-
Neisse line in any way, we would let loose ten million 
new Nazis in West Germany. I do not believe this; 
I think democracy is in West Germany to stay. And 
I think it is extremely important to us, if we wish to 
create dissension within the opponent's military camp, 
that we do not mobilize factors which create homoge-
neity and stability in his camp. Talk of resurgent 
Nazism in Germany is unfortunate. We do not want 
the Poles and Czechs to fight on the Soviet side. But 
they will fight if they feel their national interests 
are engaged. 
Dr. WOLF: In view of this fear in Eastern Europe 
of a G.erman military resurgence, I would like to 
propose a return to the Kennan proposals for military 
disengagement in Central Europe, including Ger-
many, Poland and Czechoslovakia. There might be a 
system of inspection and control of disarmament in 
these areas. Perhaps the Soviet Union would be 
willing to negotiate on this basis. 
Dr. KINTNER: My own feeling is strongly against 
disengagement. Not only are German arms necessary 
to the NATO alliance, but to seduce Western Ger-
many out of the alliance would be a signal to the 
other European allies not to play ball with tne United 
States. Western Germany has to be an integral part 
of the alliance. We must embrace Germany so 
strongly that it will remain wedded to the West. 
As for the Soviets giving up their weapons, it is 
visionary to hope for that in the near future, how-
ever much they talk about it. I believe they are 
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capable of living with instability-in fact, they thrive 
on it. 
Perhaps in the long term, if we in the free world 
show the ability to check their onrush, and they can 
see we are not digestible, then, perhaps there may 
be an accord. But it cannot happen until they see 
their humanity and our humanity as deserving to live 
on the same globe. 
ECONOMICS: 
Trading with the Enemy 
Mr. CHERNE: Secretary of Commerce Hodges pre-
dicted recently that the industrial output of the Soviet 
Union will for a long time lag behind our own. I find 
no comfort in this, but rather some cause for anxiety. 
First, the smaller Soviet economy does not devote its 
gross national product to the luxuries of consumer 
choice, the vagaries of style and conspicuous con-
sumption. Yet this smaller economy will soon exceed 
the United States in the attributes of power. 
A second reason for anxiety is the ability of the 
smaller Soviet economy radically to expand its trade 
with the developing countries. This trade increased 
almost four-fold in the last five years. Among the 
nations dependent on the Soviet Union for more than 
10 per cent of their total commerce are the United 
Arab Republic, Iceland, Guinea, Iran, Greece, Turkey, 
Finland, Iraq, Jordan, the Sudan, Cambodia and 
Uruguay. 
Finally, an important study by Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity a year ago came to the following ominous 
conclusions: The Soviet Union will be spending more 
than the United States for cold war purposes before 
1965, and the annual increm.ent of Soviet growth will 
be larger than ours, in absolute terms. The Soviet 
Union assigns a large proportion of that annual 
increment to military power. Until this year, we have 
provided none of it to power. 
The Vast Soviet Plan 
Worse is ahead. In the draft of the recent ambitious 
Soviet Party Program the Kremlin set certain goals 
which are impressive indeed. Their anticipated steel 
output in 1980, 250 million metric tons, is almost 
three times our output last year. Their expected 
growth in electric power is more than three times as 
much as we produced last year. Such goals cannot be 
dismissed, whether or not they are precisely met. 
It is not only the sheer addition to economic strength 
that is ominous. There is also the psychological con-
sequence. This consequence Walter Rostow has stated 
with great effectiveness. "Soviet momentum," he said, 
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"set against our sluggishness, tends to make per-
suasive the psychological image of an ardent com-
petitor closing fast on a front runner who has lost 
the capacity to deal with his problems and prefers to 
go down in the style to which he has become ac-
customed rather than to make the effort required to 
maintain his status." This dilemma is aggravated by 
the inability of the free nations to grasp acute Soviet .) 
weaknesses which, by Western will, could be sub-
stantially enlarged. 
The central area of weakness in the Sovie.t world is 
its persistent failures in agriculture. What have the 
free nations done about this? In 1953 and 1954, 
immediately after Stalin's death, at a moment of 
life-or-death crisis for the Kremlin, the food-pro-
ducing nations of the Western world were not at all 
reluctant to sell food that helped pacify the peoples 
under Communist rule. 
In this present year of threatening nuclear war, the 
entire Communist world is caught in acute agricul-
tural collapse-the worst disaster that has afflicted 
the Communist leaders in more than a generation. 
What have we done? We have assisted them to meet 
the human problem they face. 
What is Western policy toward the Soviet world? 
What, in fact, is Western policy even closer to home? 
Is there adequate reason for the' 25 millions which 
are spent for goods exported by Castro's Cuba? 
Would the United States really suffer desperately if 
our cigars were not enshrouded in Havana wrappers? 
Lenin was reputed to have said, "When the time 
comes for us to hang the capitalists, they will rush 
to sell us the rope." 
The Difficult Role of West Germany 
If I were to advance one reason for a Western policy, 
it would be the pressure which our own lack of policy 
imposes upon one of our most important allies, West 
Germany. The growing recognition of two Germanies, 
the permanent division of Berlin, the increasing 
clamor for nuclear sterilization of Germany-all these 
serve to strengthen those who might well be eag.er to 
see the most sharply enlarged commercial relation-
ships between Germany and the U.S.S.R. 
In this year of intensified Berlin crisis, the value of 
West German trade with the Soviet bloc countries 
increased by 24 per cent. Trade directly with the 
Soviet Union increased 43 per cent. Let me make 
clear, I am pointing no finger of accusation. -During 
this identical interval, the United States has partici-
pated in a somewhat similar increased trade with the 
Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. If a trade is some-
how detached from war and peace, then by what logic 
22 
would we expect that German industry would be less 
eager to satisfy the Soviets' need for sophisticated 
industrial output than Canada, which is quite ready 
to reduce the agricultural stress suffered by Red 
Chin 
' 
a. 
What is an appropriate economic policy that will 
enable freedom to prevail? It is urgent, in my judg-
ment, to recognize that when we trade with the Soviet 
Union and mainland China we advance strength 
which has as its primary purpose our defeat. We 
need a government apparatus capable of conducting 
economic warfare. We need among the free nations 
an apparatus to prevent our competition with each 
other from hastening the day of our decline. 
Strange Workings of Western Trade 
The one existing organization designed to coordi-
nate Western trade-CO COM, the 21-nation Coordi-
nating Committee in Paris----:.works in strange ways,. 
indeed. Take the recent example of ball-bearing 
machinery to be sold to the U.S.S.R. The United 
States came prepared to vote negatively, which 
should have done the trick, since only the United 
States has the technological ability to build such 
machines. Yet, the other COCOM nations voted to 
allow the deal-and the United States, as a loyal 
member, went along. Many of the CO COM countries 
have two policies on trade-COCOM policy and their 
own government's policy. When these two are at 
variance, they choose whichever they think is best 
at the moment. The result can be seen in Hong Kong, 
through which Canada recently air-freighted a big 
shipment of goods for Cuba. 
What I am advocating is a tougher attitude toward 
economic warfare. I suggest that it is time we fight 
fire with fire. We need a growing understanding 
within our community that our economic assistance 
must have a purpose beyond the genuine need of the 
countries which require our assistance. We cannot 
assist equally those whose future is with freedom 
and those whose understanding of the value of 
freedom is far less clear. 
The economic price of freedom is escalating. It will 
cost us all more to increase the rate of growth of 
the American economy. It will cost more to increase 
the annual increment of our growth applied to mili-
tary strength and cold war expenditures. 
The normal impulses of a peacetime private-enter-
prise system cannot be the guiding impulses of a 
nation facing the possibility of defeat. We cannot as 
separate-though-allied nations separately hang our-
selves or . each other. There is reason, in fact, to 
question whether we can long remain separate-alto-
23 
gether separate-political and economic entities. We 
are approaching a moment of test so severe that the 
Atlantic Community may well, in fact, face the choice 
of indeed becoming a community-or a figure of 
speech in a historian's reference to a group of nations 
that died. 
Mr. MAY: I agree with Mr. Cherne that the problem 
is how to meet the Soviet economic challenge effec-
tively. But I disagree with his prescription for con-
ducting economic warfare. Rather than simply ruling 
out trade with the Communist world, we should be 
seeking ways to trade with them on our terms rather 
than theirs. 
The two trading systems are completely different. 
Theirs is monolithic, completely responsive to their 
political and foreign strategy purposes. The Western 
world's is much more difficult to manage. But it is 
ridiculous for us to trade on their terms, as a great 
part of the Western World is doing-through bi-
lateral agreements, through a series of barter swaps 
in many cases-and particularly ridiculous to allow 
a set of terms to apply to that trade that we don't 
apply to most of our own trade. 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Under GATT, we have simple rules for our Western 
trade. We say that dumping is not allowable and we 
define dumping very specifically: offering articles at 
a lower price than prevails in the domestic market; 
offering articles to one country at a price lower than 
to another country; offering them at a price that is 
lower than the cost of production plus the reasonable 
cost of conducting the trade. 
The bookkeeping on some of these rules is hard to 
apply to Communist trade. But on others it is ' sur-
prisingly easy to apply. When applied, it shows that 
virtually all of their trade falls outside the rules we 
enforce among ourselves. Unfortunately, the GATT 
principles that define what you can do about it--
which is to have offsetting tariffs of a punitive or a 
protective nature-are permissive rather than com-
pulsory. Nevertheless, we have machinery and we are 
building more. We have the NATO and SEATO 
groups, and it would be very logical for them to agree 
severally to apply this. We are building up the OECD 
to control most of the word's trade and to provide a 
forum for discussing this kind of question. 
By taking strong steps we can rob trade between the 
East and the West of its very insidious character-
that is, as an instrument to promote Communist 
political ends by disrupting the world-trade system 
in which we are engaged. 
Dr. MOSELY: I question whether it is to our interest 
24 
to adopt a position of all-out hostility toward the 
Soviet Union in the economic field. Will this be effec-
tive in what we want? Will it possibly be inconsistent 
with our desire to move toward a strengthening of 
international organizations and a really effective 
system of arms control, which they now reject but 
which they may find to their advantag.e to accept at 
a later time? 
Agreement in these areas would, of course, only move 
the struggle from the nuclear-missile field into other 
fields. But I f.eel that in these fields the West, with 
its resources and its goals of national and individual 
freedom, has a tremendous advantage over the Soviet 
Union. Many of the countries now dealing closely 
with the U.S.S.R. will become less enthusiastic about 
it. Egypt, for exalilple, has learned many lessons by 
dealing with the Soviet Union. If we had succeeded in 
preventing them from dealing with the Soviet Union, 
they wouldn't have learned these lessons. The same is 
true of India. 
Mr. CHERNE: The comments of Mr. May and Pro-
fessor Mosely are directed essentially to our capacity 
to resist and to remain uninjured by Soviet economic 
warfare upon us. But the problem is still this: what 
are we doing with our very substantial strength, 
unequalled by the Soviets, that serves to weaken them 
significantly? Time is on their side, not ours. 
Mr. HARRIS: I would like to urge a stepped-up 
program of economic collaboration among the free 
nations. We should think more seriously about the 
advantages to be derived from the establishment of 
a NATO economic general staff, a high command to 
develop a common economic strategy for the. nations 
of the Atlantic community. This offers many obvious 
advantages; not the least would be the tying-together 
of economic, military and diplomatic considerations. 
But there are also three less obvious advantages: 
First, by moving in this direction we could at least 
begin to overcome our present state of stumbling 
somnambulism which is called a foreign-economic 
policy. Under this policy, with all of its contradictions 
in trade, in tariff, and in customs procedures, we keep 
preaching the virtues of political internationalism 
while retreating into the practices of economic 
isolationism. 
Second, it seems to me that such an approach could 
bring a new measure of economic vitality and a sense 
of purpose to our free economies, which are, after allp 
mixed economies. If limited only to the NATO powers 
in terms of the market, it would apply to 550 million 
people, with their combined resources in manpower, 
machinery, materials, management know-how, scien-
tific and technological talent. Once that were made 
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an operational and effective unit, we could start to 
work in concert and in a coher.ent fashion to extend 
aid and trade in a new pattern to the underdeveloped 
areas. 
There is a third perhaps startling effect which a move 
in this direction could achieve. As the economic power 
of the West expanded under such a plan, extending 
the frontiers not only of economic freedom but also 
of political freedom, the Communist bloc might find 
itself being worsted in economic competition. It 
might, therefore, be compelled to divert to consumer 
goods those resources which now go into its gigantic 
armaments build-up, in order to hold its place in the 
new world-trading pattern. If it did that, and perhaps 
only if it did that, then it would listen realistically to 
some first proposals toward an effective arms-control 
agreement. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES: 
Propaganda and the Truth 
Mr. ALLEN: In sending information abroad our aims 
should be to present the news honestly and believably. 
But these criteria of objectivity and cre.dibility raise 
certain problems. 
Should we send out unfavorable news along with the 
favorable? Should the Voice of America tell the 
world about Little Rock? 
Of course we should. Yet an honest difference arises 
over the context in which we show the Little Rock 
story. Should we admit to our listeners, for example, 
that the duly elected Governor of Arkansas had called 
on the citizens of his state to refuse to allow Negroes 
to attend schools with white children, but follow this 
closely with a reminder that more Negroes obtain 
university degrees in the United States each year 
than in the r.e.st of the world combined? 
This is a much harder question to decide. I was in 
New Delhi during the distressing events in Little 
Rock. Several Indian newspapers, served by the 
United Pre.ss, asked to have two columns of American 
news a day-solely on the Little Rock story, although 
various matters of real concern to India were being 
decided in Washington and New York. 
Sensationalism or Whitewash 1 
I had an opportunity to discuss the Little Rock story 
at about this time with a high official of the UP. He 
pointed out that the insertion of background could be 
misleading unless done with propriety. If, for exam-
ple, background were injected in a way so as to 
minimize the actual situation in Little Rock, it would 
not be good reporting, in his view. I accused him of 
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sensationalism to sell his news service. He accused me 
of wanting to whitewash the ugly facts of Little 
Rock. Perhaps there was an element of truth jn both 
accusations. What kind of propaganda we should 
send out is easy to state-we should send straight 
news-but difficult to decide in specific cases. 
This brings us to a further question. Who should 
decide what the Voice of America says? How much 
press comment should be carried, and from what 
newspapers? 
In my view, the Voice of America should have a 
clear-cut charter from the President and Congress, 
authorizing it to broadcast the news in as straight-
forward and honest a manner as humanly possible, 
including a balanced cross-section of political and 
editorial comment. The Voice of America should be 
free from day-to-day supervision by either the 
legislative or executive branches of the government. 
To achieve this, the Voice of America should be 
detached from the USIA and put under the direction 
of a non-partisan board of 12 or 15 outstanding 
citizens of the United States, recognized for their 
devotion to straight news reporting. Congress would 
still have an opportunity to review the agency's 
operations annually in connection with the appropria-
tions. But it would be a non-partisan review, since 
Voice of America would be non-partisan. 
There have been many reports that the BBC enjoys 
greater credibility than the Voice of America. This 
may be true, at least in part. BBC has several ad-
vantages over us. First, it is primarily a domestic 
operation, to which its overseas broadcasts are an 
important but secondary adjunct. All political parties 
in Britain watch BBC scripts with the closest scru-
tiny, quick to complain against any evidence of bias. 
BBC's overseas broadcasts, again, are intended pri-
marily for English-speaking listeners; its foreign 
language programs are secondary. This adds to its 
credibility, as the following example will illustrate . 
. BBC Broadcasts to Greece 
In 1956, the Greeks were quarreling bitterly with 
Great Britain oV.er the Cyprus situation. BBC was 
broadcasting to Greece every day in the Greek lan-
guage, but very few Greeks would bother to listen 
since they felt certain that any broadcast meant only 
for Greek listeners would be one-sided, hence propa-
ganda. Yet the Greek Foreign Minister told me that 
he never left his home in the morning until after the 
8 o'clock BBC news in English. He knew that such 
broadcasts, intended for the English-speaking world, 
were more likely to contain straightforward, unbiased 
news. 
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Winston Churchill's grumble during the last war that 
the BBC was "too damned neutral" goes far to 
explain the BBC's credibility. 
The Voice of America has had the advantage over 
the BBC on more than one occasion but day in and 
day out I must give grudging and envied recognition 
to BBC's high reputation. I do not believe the Voice 
of America will or can achieve this status until it is 
controlled by a non-partisan board under a well 
understood and stubbornly supported charter defining 
its terms of reference. 
If our broadcasts are not believed, we will waste our 
time and money. Our programs, to be credible, must 
contain as little propaganda as is humanly possible. 
Mr. RICHARDSON: I think it is proper that the 
USIA should disseminate both straight information 
and United States' positions as exemplified by the 
statements of its leaders. But I would also assume, 
in the context of the cold war, that we are interested 
in affecting attitudes and actions of other peoples in 
the world. In this regard I would think that through 
one agency or another we should first decide what 
attitudes and actions we seek, and second, provide 
techniques to produce them. 
This may mean one thing in one area, something else 
in another. Radio Free Europe, to a very limited 
extent, in broadcasting to a few countries of East 
Central Europe, does endeavor consciously to affect 
attitudes, though scarcely actions. But it can be effec-
tive only insofar as over-all policy makes it effective. 
In view of the political and psychological struggle in 
which we are engaged, it might be useful for us here 
to consider ways of affecting the attitudes and actions 
of other peoples-behind the Iron Curtain and this 
side of it, as well as in the uncommitted areas-in 
directions which are positive in terms of United 
States policy. 
Dr. KINr:fNER: I was about to make the same point. 
We do have a problem in distinguishing between the 
proper role of information and the proper way of 
somehow getting people to move in a direction which 
we think is favorable. 
There are instrumentalities that can be used to influ-
ence people. For example, some of us are pretty well 
identified with the United States Government, even 
though we may officially disclaim any such connec-
tion, and our statements bear corresponding weight. 
There are also the great influences of our motion 
pictures, our newspapers, and our other information 
media. But the Communists use outright propaganda. 
Whether it is true or false makes little difference; 
eventually it enables them to mobilize actions on 
their behalf. 
28 
I would like Mr. Allen to give his views as to how-
whether through private mechanisms or public mecha-
nisms-we can get across the things we stand for, 
and deflate the lies told by the opposition. How do 
you aid the truth? 
Mr. ALLEN. Basically, I think the same problem is 
posed for the government as for any loyal American 
running a private news association or a great news-
paper. If you had the editorial board of The New 
York Ti'l'Ybes here discussing this question, they would 
approach it from the point of view that nobody wants 
to give our country a black eye, or to change the 
things that make it possible for The TiWJes to be 
published in an atmosphere of freedom. Yet The 
Tim;e8' basic principle is "All the News that's Fit to 
Print." 
That is the great dilemma. Weare all fallible and 
there is just so much a human being can do. You 
have to keep in mind when you speak of being an 
advocate for any viewpoint, that the fellows on the 
receiving end are not Americans. They are usually 
predisposed to be rather skeptical toward what they 
ar,e going to hear. In order to be effective, in order 
to be credible, in order to persuade anybody, we are 
not going to get far pushing our own point of view. 
Mr. STEIBEL: Mr. Allen, I think you were associated 
with the drive within USIA to get more participation 
in the policy-making phases of gov.ernment. Once you 
achieve this, how can you ask to be free of super-
vision and simply allowed to follow the dictates of 
truth? You say we should take the Voice of America 
out of government and set it up under a board. But 
this still leaves you with two problems. One, as a 
policy-maker, for whom do you speak in the minds 
of your listeners; of Whom are you the voice? And, 
second, suppose you have the problem, as you do now, 
of convincing audiences that our position on Berlin is 
credible. Suppose the chairman of your non-partisan 
committee doesn't happen to like this as a policy? 
He may be a pacifist, or something else. Doesn't this 
still leave you with the original problem, which is 
that somebody has to speak officially in the name of 
the United States Government, and that he cannot, 
therefore, be disassociated from all of its decisions? 
Mr. ALLEN: I think the answer is simple. I said I 
thought the radio program, the Voice of America, 
ought to be put under a non-partisan board. The rest 
of the activity of the United States Information 
Agency would certainly remain as it is, and the 
efforts of the head of the agency to be an important 
official in government could even be redoubled. He 
would have his influence in the councils of govern-
ment. But the pronouncements about our foreign 
policy would be made primarily by the President, the 
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Secretary of State, and so forth. The Voice of 
America would be able to voice those. The announcer 
doesn't have to be the originator of statements of 
policy. 
Mr. DEAC: I would like to say something on behalf 
of the foreign-born groups in the United States. 
These groups have been very disappointed ever since 
1945. We Americans have let the world down; we 
have let ourselves down; we have let our principles 
down; and we have let our guard down as well. It 
was heartwarming to hear Mr. Drummond say that 
there is a large segment of our opinion that knows 
what it wants and is way ahead of our political 
leadership. That is true. 
Speaking for the ethnic groups, I can say that they 
are way ahead of our political leadership in both 
parties. We would suggest one thing to our govern-
ment leaders: don't g,et soft, because there has been 
too much softness already. Get tough. That is the 
only language the Communists understand. Don't be 
afraid of public opinion. Public opinion is asking you 
to show the way. 
In propaganda, we believe our ethnic groups are 
more knowledg.eable than most Americans. But these 
groups, which have excellent relations around the 
world and which are better placed than other Ameri-
cans to make friends around the world, have been 
systematically excluded from our propaganda effort. 
Mr. EMMET: I would like to take exception to 
Ambassador Allen's basic thesis. The idea of having 
a committee of newsmen run the Voice is fantastic. 
We have two problems. 
One is that in the captive nations people are risking 
their lives to listen to us. They are not interested in 
spot news, in airplane accidents or earthquakes. They 
want to know whether we are going to win, what 
hope they have that we will act on one policy. They 
don't want to know whether we are of two minds. 
Two, when it comes to our allies, they want to know 
what we are talking about. Instead of doing what 
Mr. Allen suggested, I would say the opposite. Put 
the libraries in the hands of newsmen, but put the 
Voice, the fighting element of our operation, in the 
hands of people who can combine the functions of 
teachers and advertisers. 
I was in England in 1954 when Senator McCarthy 
was at his height. Why wasn't the United States 
Information Agency telling the British how a McCar-
thy could exist in our country? Why didn't t4ey tell 
the history of American Congressional Committees? 
There was no way of quoting the President; the 
President didn't dare talk about McCarthy. 
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Mr. ALLEN: Thank you for gIVIng me the best 
illustration I could possibly have thought of for my 
own case. You asked why the Voice of America wasn't 
telling the British about McCarthy. Because the 
Voice of America was part of the Administration. 
There were a few bold souls brave enough to speak 
out about McCarthyism, but they didn't last long. 
The Voice of America was under the domination of 
Senator McCarthy. 
Mrs. OVERSTREET: In what additional ways be-
sides the Voice of America can the U. S. communicate 
with other peoples? 
Mr. ALLEN: We use every means humanly possible. 
In many areas of the world, motion pictures and 
documentary films are more effective than anything 
.else. In Belgrade, the United States Information 
Library is on the main drag. At one time, when 
relations between the United States and Yugoslavia 
were tense, word went around that it was dangerous 
for a man's reputation to be seen inside our library. 
We had windows on the str.eet and put up pictures 
every week of what was going on; the place was 
jammed every night. It stopped traffic. 
In Russia we have a hard time reaching the people, 
but we did reach three million through our exhibit 
in Moscow in 1958. 
We work with American travelers, with tourists. 
Mrs. Overstreet, I know how effective you and your 
husband have been on the platform in foreign coun-
tries. Whatever can be done by human ingenuity, 
we do. 
Dr. MOSELY: In this respect I would like to say just 
a word about the cultural revolution which has taken 
place in perhaps 60 countries around the world, and 
to urge that, in addition to strategic and economic 
and political programs, we need to do a great deal 
more in the field of education, communications, and 
cultural development. Let me giv.e you just one or 
two examples. 
In India we were handicapped for more than ten 
years by the fact that Soviet books, in English, were 
being sold for a very small prie&-10, 15, 25 cents, 
and textbooks for the equivalent of 50 cents. For 
many years, we couldn't sell American books. But 
now the American Book Council has a program, with 
the aid of the United States Government, to have 
American books reprinted in India and sold at Indian 
prices. They are still higher than Soviet books, but 
our experience so far is that the Indian intellectuals, 
by and large, would rather pay the equivalent of 75 
cents or one dollar for a book they want to read, 
than 15 or 25 cents for a book that is not only dull 
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but full of dogmatism. We ought to multiply these 
examples around the world. 
There is room for a whole revolution in techniques 
of book production and sales. Many .of you are 
familiar with the program of the Franklin Publica-
tions which is working toward this .end. They don't 
tell the people what books they should print, but 
offer them a choice, help them identify their needs. 
In several countries the revolution has already oc-
curred-in book publishing, bookselling, libraries, 
including mobile libraries in Iran. 
But we need to do much more than we are doing to 
train people f.or journalism, for responsible work in 
analysis of world affairs, as .educators, as business-
men, as entrepreneurs. 
If the world strategic situation, which these countries 
can affect very much, ever comes into a kind of 
balance, perhaps the final decisions ultimately will be 
made by people that we will (or will not) have aided 
to make their own ch.oices. I think that answers, in 
part, the question about what we have to offer. We 
offer something the Soviets cannot offer-though 
they pretend to offer it--and that is a real choice of 
things, the techniques, the knowledge that the ambi-
tious people of these countries want. 
SUMMATION: 
Renewing Our Intellectual Armament 
Dr. GIDEONSE: The key idea in Ambassador Wads-
worth's address seemed to me to be that "this must 
be the last crisis to which we come unprepared." But 
what is preparation? First of all, it is awareness of 
the larger strategy as against the last emerging, 
immediate issue in the headlines. As far as the last 
fifteen years is concerned, determining the larger 
strategy has not been a great source of difficulty. 
We had our eye on the larger strategy when we 
inaugurated the Marshall Plan, despite the difficulties 
posed by traditional ways of thinking in the United 
States. We bridged those difficulties primarily through 
a link between the Democratic Party and Republican 
Senator Vandenberg in the Senate. We did a magnifi-
cent job with the Marshall Plan, a b.etter job of its 
kind than I think has ever before been done in 
economic and political history. In fact, we did so w&ll 
that the nations of Western Europe now talk back to 
us-so vigorously that we might almost wish for 
some of the docility of pre-Marshall Plan days. 
The organization of the North Atlantic military 
alliance-NATO-was another superior job of carry-
ing forward the larger strategy. 
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A third example was the substitution of United 
States responsibility for British in the Communist-
threatened Near and Middle East. This move, usually 
described, as "The Truman Doctrine," began in 
Greece and Turkey and led to Lebanon and other 
episodes. 
A Larger Strategy 
The question now is whether we still have that grasp 
of the larger strategy in what President Kennedy 
has called this crucial decade of the Sixties. A good 
example of the dilemma was presented by Dr. Brze-
zinski when he reminded us that the formula that 
saves us Berlin could lose us West Germany-and 
ultimately NATO and Western Europe. 
I found Mr. Berle's remarks very refreshing because 
a liberal who re-thinks his basic presuppositions is 
even scarcer and more surprising than a conservative 
who does it. This was a beautiful example of a first-
class mind offering a re-orientation of our thinking 
about what he termed "the myth of world opinion." 
The thing that emerges in almost all these discussions 
is the need f.or yardsticks, standards by which we 
can judge the immediate issues before us in terms of 
strategic policy. We need something to help us make 
up 'Our mind which really is the most important use 
of scarce resources-economic, military, whatever it 
may be. Dr. Kissinger used the phrase that we need 
a concept of the free world that "informs 'Our action." 
It also has been said here that if the Common Market 
is considered as a concept that should be enlarged 
to include the whole Atlantic Community, it could 
give an additional dynamic to our ideological position. 
This is the one thing that is badly needed in-to name 
one instance--Western Europe. The students there, 
misled though they may be in our judgment, still see 
a dynamic in the Soviet philosophy; they miss it in 
our position. 
The Predictable Consequences 
There is also another idea that emerged again and 
again in these discussions, and that is the way in 
which we tend to analyze our opponents. We want to 
know what they are really thinking, as compared 
with what they say and what the traditional positions 
of Lenin, Stalin and the past positions of Khrushchev 
have been. At the same time I think there was a very 
healthy realization-pragmatic and therefore truly 
American - that the really basic question is not 
what our opponents believe, but what are the pre-
dictable consequences of what they are doing. This 
is something we lose sight of in our day-by-day 
search for a negotiating formula on Berlin. What 
are the predictable consequences in West Germany 
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of what they are doing? If there is some form of 
neutralization of West Germany, and if there is then 
some form of recognition of the repression in Central 
Europe, with the demoralization that would ensue 
for all the peoples in that strategically crucial area, 
you have a picture of what I mean by predictable 
consequences. We thereby would completely lose the 
cutting edge of our traditional appeal to the minds 
of free men. If we lose that, we are reduced to prac-
tically nothing but the military and material factors. 
I dare say that would be just about the least advan-
tageous position we could put ourselves in. 
Kissinger pointed out that we must on the one hand 
restore that cutting edge by some form of widening 
and integration of the idea by which we live, and 
must on the -other concern ourselves more imagina-
tively with the question of what are the legitimate 
security factors in Russia's thinking as contrasted 
to the ones that are called security but are really 
aggressive imperialist intentions. 
This is hard to do because, as many people have said, 
there is a great deal of hypocrisy in Russian talk 
about their security. 
On the one hand, therefore, you have the need to 
widen the economic and military and political base 
of an Atlantic Community; on the other, there is the 
need for greater awareness of the legitimacy of 
Russia's concern for her security. 
The Meaning of Freedom 
I c·ome back to what is, to me, perhaps the greatest 
weakness in our armament. It is not technical and 
not economic, important as those factors are. It is 
that we lack clarity in spelling out for our time the 
meaning of the word "freedom." No thought emerged 
more frequently than that one in these discussions. 
This is an old theme, but it has been refreshed by our 
discussions here. Too often w.e simply take freedom 
for granted. Our specialists are all concerned with 
little splinters of the log. They don't concern them-
selves with the larger questions. "That," they say, 
"is somebody else's specialty." But that "somebody 
else" doesn't exist; we must all carry part of the load. 
There is an abiding need for high-quality concern 
with the nature of our intellectual armament. For one 
thing, we keep talking about tension or insecurity as 
if it were something regrettable that has to be re-
moved. Sure enough, some kinds of tension and 
insecurity should be removed, if we can do so~ But 
let me remind you, a free society that will inform our 
action and be true to our historic experience cannot 
be developed without promoting ins.ecurity. Wherever 
there is freedom of choice, there is insecurity for 
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those whose ideas are not chosen. Freedom and 
insecurity are inherently interwoven; they belong 
together. 
Freedom is not an abstraction to be defined by philos-
ophers. Freedom is defined by the historic experience 
of free men. It is always characterized by the pres-
ence of choice, the right to pursue human values and 
purposes, and the guaranty of human and civil rights. 
It calls for the limited state, that is to say a consti-
tution which places the government as well as the 
governed under law. 
All these historic achievements are rooted in a certain 
image of man-not just man as a producer and as a 
consumer who is expected to contribute to production, 
but the whole man with all his esthetic, moral, and 
religious aspirations. This image of man sees him as 
a potential angel as well as a potential devil. It 
reminds us that the danger of the potential devil 
submerging the potential angel is enlarged in direct 
proportion to the extent that man is entrusted with 
unlimited power. 
The progress of science and technology demonstrates 
that whatever enhances man's power over his physi-
cal environment without strengthening his capacity 
for self-control is pernicious. The free society depends 
upon refreshing the sources of responsibility-the 
opportunity for self-control. 
The Will to Win 
Mr. MOWRER: I came here thinking that free men 
could prevail, and I go back certain that they can. 
Unhappily, I am not sure that they will. The mere 
choice of the title of this assembly-"How Free Men 
Can Prevail"-gives away the game, for it assumes 
that they are not yet prevailing. 
Everybody now sees that we have the means of 
winning. And yet we are not winning. Certainly it is 
not for lack of trying. But it is for lack of trying to 
do the right thing. It seems to me we have been 
trying, not to prevail, but to survive. Our problem 
is not to put off crises and gain a little time. It is to 
win the cold war. 
What is needed was once expressed by ~ethe who, 
in figuring out why God created Germany, said, "In 
the beginning was the deed; and that deed on the 
part of the Lord I feel sure was an act of will." 
Only when we have demonstrated this "act of will" 
will things fall into shape. 
Once we have faced the inexorable fact that we need 
to win if we are to survive, then surely we will find 
that a prolongation of peace by concessions is only 
bringing war nearer. Each time it merely seems to 
provoke a desir.e for more concessions, and so we 
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come closer to that horrible day when we shall really 
be asked to engage in major war or surrender. 
On the other hand, by deciding to win, we reduce the 
chances of war. By mobilizing all of our superior 
energies, our superior resources, our superior philos-
ophy, we have what it takes to win. By creating a 
permanent preponderance over our adversary and his 
underworld philosophy, we will develop such a barrier 
to further trouble that we will find that we may not 
have to win. Once we have decided that nothing short 
of prevalence will do the job, we have a chance of 
convincing the adversary. Only when we convince the 
adversary that he will never win will we have a 
chance of bringing about within the Soviet Union, 
Red China, and the other Communist nations those 
transformations which would enable the conflict to 
subside. 
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